Autocompensating Quantum Cryptography by Bethune, Donald S. & Risk, William P.
1Autocompensating Quantum Cryptography 
  
Donald S. Bethune and William P. Risk 
  IBM Almaden Research Center 
  650 Harry Road 
  San Jose, CA 95120-6099, USA 
  bethune@almaden.ibm.com and risk@almaden.ibm.com 
  
 
 
Abstract.  Quantum cryptographic key distribution (QKD) uses extremely faint 
light pulses to carry quantum information between two parties (Alice and Bob), 
allowing them to generate a shared, secret cryptographic key.  Autocompensating 
QKD systems automatically and passively compensate for uncontrolled time-
dependent variations of the optical fiber properties by coding the information as a 
differential phase between orthogonally-polarized components of a light pulse 
sent on a round trip through the fiber, reflected at mid-course using a Faraday 
mirror.  We have built a prototype system based on standard telecom technology 
that achieves a privacy-amplified bit generation rate of ~1000 bits/s over a 10-km 
optical fiber link.  Quantum cryptography is an example of an application that, by 
using quantum states of individual particles to represent information, 
accomplishes a practical task that is impossible using classical means. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Quantum Cryptography 
Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution (QKD), invented by Bennett and Brassard 
and described in their classic “BB84” paper [1], uses the states of single photons to carry 
information between two parties, traditionally called Alice and Bob.  By performing a joint, 
remote experiment with these photons, followed by a public discussion of the results, Alice and 
Bob can generate a shared cryptographic key.  Furthermore, by exploiting the quantum nature of 
the photons, they can be sure that their key is secure, even though an eavesdropper (Eve) has 
unrestricted access to the photons as they travel between Alice and Bob through an optical fiber 
or free space, and has full knowledge of all other classical communications between them.  
Bennett and co-workers also provided the first experimental demonstration of QKD in 1989 [2], 
using weak light pulses transmitted 30 cm through free space.  Subsequently, numerous groups 
have built a variety of systems for carrying out QKD, both over optical fiber and through free 
space.  Ref. [3] provides an excellent recent review of the field. 
2In its simplest (and to date, most practical) form, quantum information is encoded in the 
states of single photons (or extremely faint coherent light pulses) that travel from Alice to Bob.  
An equivalent [4], but more difficult, method for conveying quantum information is to let Alice 
and Bob share an entangled pair of photons [3-8].  In that case, a definite value of a physical 
quantity (such as angular momentum or energy) is associated with the pair state, but not with 
either of the photons individually.  For these entangled-pair states, very strong correlations will 
exist in the results of measurements Alice and Bob make on their separate photons, allowing 
them to generate a cryptographic key from these results and public discussion of them.  
Eavesdropping necessarily reduces the degree of correlation between Alice and Bob’s 
measurements, so the degree of correlation in the data can be used to calculate an upper bound 
on the amount of information leaked to possible adversaries.   
1.2. Autocompensating interferometry as a basis for QKD 
A general challenge for quantum information is to choose a coding scheme that avoids 
disturbance by the dominant noise sources.  For QKD based on either fiber or free space optical 
systems, fluctuations of the medium through which the photons travel are a source of noise.  In 
free space, atmospheric density fluctuations are locally highly isotropic.  Because polarization 
coding is essentially a differential phase encoding between two orthogonal polarization states, 
density fluctuations give rise to ‘common mode’ phase fluctuations, which do not degrade the 
contrast between the polarization basis states.  Perturbations of the photon’s propagation 
direction by density fluctuations only reduce the collection efficiency and key generation rate.   
The situation is quite different when QKD is carried out over optical fibers. Optical fiber 
systems are a natural choice for QKD over distances up to several tens of kilometers, particularly 
since fiber optic networks already connect many computers.  Unfortunately standard optical fiber 
(for example SMF-28) has small but significant birefringence due to variations in its structure 
and composition and due to mechanical stresses caused, for example, by bends and twists. Other 
optical components used in a fiber optic network can also introduce birefringence.  These effects 
lead to random time-varying changes of polarization state, so that constant measurement of the 
properties of the optical fiber and active feedback control of some sort of compensating optical 
devices is required to use polarization as a basis for coding quantum information.  
While this active approach has been successfully used in fiber-optic QKD systems [9], it is 
also possible to build a system that inherently compensates for changing fiber characteristics by 
using a differential coding scheme.  This idea can be understood by considering Martinelli’s 
observation that light sent on a round trip through an optical fiber terminated with a Faraday 
mirror returns in the polarization state orthogonal to that in which it started, independent of the 
optical properties of the fiber [10].  This property arises from the fact that a Faraday mirror 
exchanges orthogonal polarization states, with the consequence that the total phase accumulated 
by light over the course of a round-trip is independent of the input polarization.  Because of this, 
information encoded as a differential phase between two orthogonal polarization states will be 
unaffected by birefringence in the system, provided that this birefringence does not change in the 
3time it takes light to make a round-trip through the fiber ( 2 /n c ~10 µs/km).  The idea that a 
QKD system could be made insensitive to the state of the fiber by using round-trip propagation 
with a Faraday reflection mid-course was developed independently by groups at the University 
of Geneva [11-14] and IBM [15,16], who built systems that used 1.3-µm light.  Operation at 
1.55-µm, preferred for long-haul telecom systems, has also been demonstrated [17,18]. 
1.3. Mathematical treatment of autocompensating system 
Martinelli originally used the Jones matrix formalism to show that a Faraday mirror can 
“orthoconjugate” light–i.e., generally transform any polarization state into an orthogonally-
polarized state.  This formalism can be extended to describe autocompensating QKD systems.  
We represent the transformation of the polarization state of light propagating forward and 
backward through an optical component or system by matrices T and RT  given by  
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Here U and V are arbitrary unitary matrices that transform between the eigenmode basis of the 
optical system and any desired bases at the system ends, and iXe and iYe  describe the phase and 
amplitude changes for each of the eigenmodes.  The matrices for backward propagation through 
such components are derived from their forward counterparts by transposing and negating the 
off-diagonal elements (following the convention that backward propagating fields be described 
in a right-handed coordinate system with reversed z- and x- axes) [19-21].  For reciprocal 
components, X and Y are independent of propagation direction.  For non-reciprocal components 
such as Faraday rotators, reversing the propagation direction also changes the sign of the Faraday 
rotation angle, given by c o on k L VBk Lγ = ∆ =  where ( )12cn n n− +∆ = −  [with n± the refractive 
indices for positive and negative helicity light], ok  is the light wavevector in vacuo, V is the 
Verdet constant, B is the component of magnetic field parallel to ok , and L is the path length in 
the medium.  Thus the forward and backward polarization transformations through a Faraday 
rotator are related by ( ) ( )RF Fγ γ= − , and can be written as 2 2×  rotation matrices for angles 
γ± .  Purely optically-active media are described similarly, but with no sign change for γ  in the 
reverse direction.  
 A Faraday mirror, which is a combination of a 45D  Faraday rotator and a normal mirror, 
transforms polarization states according to the Jones matrix: 
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FM can be multiplied by a factor r to account for attenuation and phase shift due to the optics.  It 
is readily verified that for unitary matrices such as U, RU FM U FM⋅ ⋅ = .  Thus, for a round trip 
4through a system described by T and terminated by a Faraday mirror, the overall Jones matrix M 
is given by RM T FM T= ⋅ ⋅ , or 
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M is simply given by the Faraday mirror matrix multiplied by overall phase and amplitude 
attenuation factors.  If several components described by iT of the form in Equation (1) are 
concatenated before Faraday reflection, a round trip is described by the matrix M with X and Y  
replaced by iX∑ and iY∑ , respectively.  The final polarization state of light after a round trip 
is still orthogonal to the initial state, independent of the properties of the optical system described 
by the iT , and the total phase accumulated is ( )i iX YΣ + , independent of the initial polarization 
state. 
When a light pulse with horizontal polarization state 
0
H
i
aψ  =     is presented at the input 
of such a system, the state that is returned is 
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which has vertical linear polarization.  Similarly, when the vertically polarized state
0
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to the system, the returned state is ( )
0
i ii X Y Vae rΣ +Σ  − ⋅ ⋅    , and is horizontally polarized.  The 
prefactors are the same in both cases; thus no differential phase shift or attenuation is introduced 
between two orthogonally polarized light pulses that travel on a round trip through the same 
sequence of optical elements terminated by a Faraday mirror.  
For QKD, this result allows Alice and Bob to robustly encode quantum information in the 
differential phase between orthogonally polarized pulses.   In the preceding discussion, we 
assumed that the modal phase shifts X and Y were the same for outgoing and returning light.  
However, this will only be true if the system optical properties vary slowly compared to the 
round trip time for light.  By deliberately violating this condition using fast phase modulators, 
Alice and Bob can introduce useful differential phase shifts between the orthogonal polarization 
states.  These shifts can be read out at Bob’s station either polarimetrically (by combining the 
orthogonally polarized waves) or interferometrically (by combining the waves with parallel 
polarization) using appropriate optics.  Systems built at IBM based on these two read-out 
methods are described below in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
52. Experiments using bulk optical components 
2.1. Experimental setup 
Figure 1 shows the initial version of our quantum cryptography set up.  Alice and Bob’s setups, 
in the same lab but with separate computers and independent equipment, are only connected via 
a 10-km (or 20-km) SMF-28 optical fiber link that carries both quantum information at 1.3-µm 
and wavelength multiplexed bi-directional timing and coordination pulses using 1.55-µm 
transceivers.  They also communicate via the building LAN to carry on public discussions. 
In this optical design, a horizontally polarized pulse from the 1.31 µm DFB laser (Lucent 
D2304G) passes through a variable attenuator and bat-wing polarization adjuster (not shown) 
and then is fiber-coupled to a bulk optical polarization and analysis module.  The pulse passes 
through two polarizing beamsplitters PBS1 and PBS2 (with canceling 45± D  rotations between 
due to the Faraday rotator and WP1), and then after a 45D  rotation by WP2, is split by PBS3 into 
H- and V- polarized components with amplitudes we can describe by the vector 
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Figure 1.  QKD system using free-space bulk optical polarizing beamsplitters 
(PBS).  FR – Faraday Rotator; WP1, WP2 - λ/2 waveplates; WM – 1310/1550 nm 
multiplexers; PMA,B – phase modulators; FM – Faraday mirror; D0,1 - detectors; 
DFB Laser – distributed feedback 1310 nm laser, pulsed to give ~50 ps pulses. 
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6The H-component (H) is launched into the SMF-28 fiber, while the V-component (V) is delayed 
a time τ ∼30 ns by a loop of polarization-maintaining fiber before a second encounter with PBS3 
directs it into the fiber toward Alice.  Since pulses H and V pass through the system at different 
times, they can be independently traced through the system in order to determine their states 
upon returning to PBS3.  
 
2.1.1.  The H-polarized pulse 
 
After passage through the fiber, H arrives at PBS4 in an arbitrary elliptical polarization state 
given by 1 0H HTψ ψ= , where T describes propagation between PBS3 and PBS4.  PBS4 separates 
H into x- and y-components corresponding to the axes of the polarization maintaining fibers 
connecting PBS4 to Alice’s phase modulator (PMA) and the Faraday mirror.  By placing PMA in 
a loop as shown in figure 2, an annealed-proton-exchange (APE) LiNbO3 waveguide modulator 
can be used to apply an overall phase shift to the arbitrarily polarized pulse, even though the 
waveguide transmits only one linear polarization (y). The y-polarized component of 1Hψ  is sent 
by PBS4 directly to PMA.   The x component travels to the Faraday mirror, is rotated to y-
polarization by the FM, returns to PBS4, and is coupled into the loop by PBS4.  PMA is offset 
from the loop midpoint by an optical path L equal to the path from PBS4 to the FM, so that the 
counter-propagating x and y pulse components meet in PMA having each traveled the same 
distance (C/2+L) from PBS4, where C is the loop circumference.  This arrangement places the 
modulator at the exact midpoint of the overall optical path.  As the x and y components pass 
through PMA at the same time in opposite directions, an equal phase shift AHφ  is imparted to 
both of them.  The component that was originally x-polarized continues counterclockwise around 
the loop to PBS4.  The component that was originally y-polarized travels clockwise around the 
loop to PBS4 and then onto the FM, where it is rotated to x-polarization and sent back to PBS4, 
where the two components are reunited.   
The overall combined effect of PBS4, the fiber loop and phase modulator, the Faraday 
mirror, and the attenuation due to WM and Alice’s other components (which is included in r), 
can be described by the matrix: 
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Here ( )s x yk L k C Lφ = + + is a static phase shift that takes into account the birefringence of the 
polarization-maintaining fiber path. This arrangement is thus equivalent to a standard Faraday 
mirror plus a controllable phase shift, AHφ , that can be intentionally applied using Alice’s phase 
modulator.  After reflection, phase shifting and attenuation, as represented by matrix FM’, pulse 
H returns through the fiber to PBS3, arriving in the state 
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Thus H, which originally was horizontally-polarized, returns to PBS3 vertically-polarized and is 
directed through Bob’s delay loop.  The loop adds both a fixed phase, τφ , and a controllable 
phase BHφ  that Bob can apply using PMB.  H then arrives at PBS3 for the second time in the state  
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where the attenuation and fixed phase factors have been combined into the new constant r′. 
 
2.1.2.  The V-polarized pulse 
 
The vertically polarized pulse V, initially in state 0Vψ , travels through the system in an analogous 
way, but passes through the delay loop immediately on departure.  As it did for H, the loop adds 
the fixed phase τφ  and a phase shift BVφ , controlled by PMB.  V returns to PBS3 in the state 
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which is horizontally-polarized and has an intentional phase shift AV BVφ φ+ .   
Recall that the first pulse, H, is directed through Bob’s delay loop on its return to PBS3 and 
arrives at PBS3 for the second time after a delay τ.  Since τ is also the delay between H and V, 
H’s second arrival at PBS3 coincides with V’s arrival.  The two orthogonally-polarized pulses 
thus emerge from PBS3 at the same time, overlapping in space, and travel together toward WP2.   
The polarization state of the recombined pulse as it leaves PBS3 can be expressed by the vector: 
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where ( ) ( )
2
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2
AV BV AH BHφ φ φ φφ + − +∆ = .   
In typical operation, Alice sets 0AHφ =  while the first pulse passes through the modulator and 
then rapidly switches to 0AVφ ≠  in a time short compared to the delay τ  between the H and V 
8pulses. Similarly, Bob turns his modulator off for all pulses leaving his station ( 0BVφ = ), but 
sometimes applies a phase 0BHφ ≠ to returning pulses, so that 2
AV BHφ φφ −∆ = . 
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Figure 2.  An arrangement for Faraday reflecting an arbitrarily polarized pulse 
with an overall phase shift φA using a single-polarization phase modulator. [Click 
this link to see an animated depiction of the operation of this arrangement] 
 
 
2.1.3. Polarization analysis for decoding the quantum bits 
 
After leaving PBS3, the light represented by state 3ψ  is rotated by WP2 to the final state 
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Recalling that the state 0
H
V
a
a
ψ  =    was originally produced by the passage of a purely 
horizontally-polarized state through WP2 in the forward direction, we can write: 
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so that 
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 In the ideal case WP2 is rotated to the angle / 8θ π= , and thus  
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This shows that PBS2 directs all of the light to D0 for φ∆  an even multiple of 2π , and to D1 
(via PBS1) for φ∆  an odd multiple of 2π .  If WP2 is rotated by δ  away from its ideal angle, 
the fraction of the intensity leaking to D1 has a minimum value ( )24δ  (when φ π∆ = ), while the 
minimum intensity to D0 (for φ∆ =0) will be 0, independent of δ .  A 2° misalignment of WP2, 
for example, will misroute ~2% of the intensity for even φ∆ /( 2π ), while for odd φ∆ /( 2π ) all 
photons will be routed correctly.  Thus, on average, a 2° misalignment of θ  will contribute ~1% 
to the bit error rate (BER). 
With their shared control over the differential phase shift φ∆  in Equation (13), Alice and 
Bob can implement the 4-state BB84 protocol.  A possible assignment of basis and bit values to 
Alice and Bob’s phase shifts is given in Table 1.  When Alice and Bob match bases, with both 
choosing either an odd or an even multiple of 2π , the photons are deterministically routed to a 
specific detector, depending on Alice’s choice of bit. 
 
 Basis, Bit odd, 0 even, 1 odd, 1 even, 0 
Basis Bφ ↓  /    Aφ →  2π−  0  2π  π  
odd 2π−  D0 ? D1 ? 
even 0  ? D0 ? D1 
     
Table 1.  Example of an assignment of bit and basis to various Aφ , Bφ  
combinations.  For deterministic cases the detector receiving the photon is 
indicated, while random arrival cases are indicated by ?.   
2.2. Single-photon detection using pulse biased InGaAs avalanche photodiode (APD) detectors 
Quantum cryptography requires detection of single photons.  The circuit used for this task is 
shown in figure 3a.  Two Fujitsu FPD5W1KS InGaAs detectors, optimally cooled to ~118 K and 
DC biased just below their reverse breakdown voltage (~30 V), are biased above breakdown for 
~ 1.5 ns by a 3.3 V pulse at times when photons are expected to arrive.  To avoid having the 
photocurrent pulse buried in the capacitive transient induced on the output line by the bias pulse 
10
(see, for example, the beginning of the scope traces in figure 3b), the circuit shown in figure 3a 
implements a simple transient canceling scheme.  SMA tees are connected to the APD cathode 
and anode, with 50-Ω matched transmission lines and pulse-bias input and signal-output lines 
attached as shown.  The open upper delay line reflects the bias pulse without inversion, while the 
shorted lower delay line gives an inverted reflection of the capacitive transient.  The reflected 
bias pulse drives a second transient, which adds to and cancels the returning inverted transient, 
thus holding the anode voltage constant.  The photocurrent pulse due to a detected photon, which 
coincides with only one of the bias pulses, is not cancelled, and gives a signal above a nearly flat 
baseline, as shown by the middle trace of figure 3b.  This signal pulse is amplified and sent to an 
electronic gate (described in detail in [16]), giving the final output pulse shown by the lower 
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Figure 3.  a) Detector circuit diagram. [Click on this link to see an animated 
depiction of the operation of this circuit] b) Upper trace: raw detector output with 
no detected photon; middle trace: raw output with detected photon; lower trace: 
signal outputs with and without detected photon after amplification and gating. 
a) 
b) 
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trace of figure 3b, overlaid on a trace obtained with no photon signal present.  The output pulses 
are sent to a discriminator followed by appropriate logic and counting modules.  The transient 
cancellation is independent of pulse amplitude, pulse shape, and photodiode characteristics.  
The detectors are pulse biased at 1 MHz, and with peak voltages ~2 V above breakdown a 
quantum efficiency 20%η ∼  with dark count probability ~ 2–4×10-5 is achieved.  The 1.55-µm 
timing pulses sent from Bob to Alice are used to synchronize the modulator PMA to the arriving 
light pulses, and are echoed from Alice to Bob to trigger Bob’s detector bias pulser and drive a 
counter to keep track of the pulse number.  The Fujitsu detectors have worked well, but operate 
best at quite low temperature and unfortunately are no longer available.  However, recent work 
has identified devices (JDS Uniphase EPM 239 AA SS) that have acceptably good performance 
even above 200 K, making thermoelectric cooling an attractive option [22-24].   
 
 
3. All fiber-optical setup 
3.1. Experimental set-up 
An improved version of the experimental apparatus is shown in figure 4.  This version 
incorporates an all-fiber version of Bob’s delay loop and pulse analysis optics that follows the  
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Figure 4.  Experimental arrangement for all fiber-optical QKD system. 
 
elegant design of Ribordy et al. [14], with the slight modification that polarization maintaining 
fiber is used throughout, so no polarization adjusters are needed in the phase-sensitive portion of 
the optical path.  Bob, rather than initially splitting a 45° polarized beam using a bulk-optical 
polarizing beam-splitter cube, splits his linearly-polarized input pulse into two replicas using a 
12
2×2 fiber coupler constructed with polarization-maintaining fiber.  The upper leg of the splitter is 
connected to a fiber-optic polarizing beam splitter (PBS) with a connector modified to couple 
two polarization-maintaining fibers with their fast axes perpendicular.  The delayed pulse from 
the lower branch of the coupler reaches the PBS without polarization rotation, and leaves Bob’s 
station polarized orthogonally to the undelayed pulse, as in the earlier setup.  
Alice also incorporates a fiber PBS with polarization-maintaining fiber to implement her 
phase modulator loop.  Keeping the light in single mode fiber at both stations reduces the optical 
loss significantly, and most importantly, gives on/off interferometric switching contrast at the 
variable coupler of ~ 650:1, an order-of-magnitude higher than the 62:1 contrast obtained with 
the bulk-optic polarizers.  It is also simpler to use a fiber optic circulator module to direct light to 
D1 than to use the waveplate / Faraday-rotator / bulk PBS combination shown in figure 1. 
If we assume the initial coupler is symmetric, with amplitude transmission and reflection 
coefficients t and i r⋅  respectively (r and t real), we obtain expressions for the final amplitudes in 
the D0 and D1 channels analogous to those in Eqn. 12, with the substitutions ( )sin 4 2i r tθ → ⋅ ⋅  
and ( ) ( )2 2cos 4 t rθ → − .  The minimum probability for photons to be routed to D1 is (t2-r2)2.  A 
non-ideal coupler with a 55:45 power splitting ratio, for example, will direct ~ 1% of the photons 
to D1 at nominal null ( φ∆ = π).  With careful adjustment of the polarization maintaining variable 
coupler, we achieve a leakage rate 3–4 times lower than this. 
 
 
4. Key Generation 
4.1. System operation 
Computers at Alice and Bob’s stations, running LabVIEW™ programs, control the QKD 
system.  They sequentially carry out the quantum information transfer, error correction, and 
privacy amplification.  The weak 1.3-µm pulses and the 1.55-µm timing pulses are carried over a 
single SMF-28 optical fiber, while coordinating signals and data for error correction and privacy 
amplification are sent using TCP/IP over the building LAN.  Data obtained for 10- and 20-km 
fiber links with the all-fiber system are shown in figure 5.  The raw key rates (squares) for 
photons detected with matching bases for Alice and Bob (~ ½ the total detection rate) are given 
by 12 Tfµη , where µ  is the mean number of photons/pulse leaving Alice’s station, 0.2η =  is the 
detector quantum efficiency, 0.08T =  (0.032) is the 10 km (20 km) link transmittance (~ 8 dB 
loss for Bob’s components with the remainder due to fiber loss) and 1 MHzf =  is the pulse 
repetition frequency. 
The error-corrected rates (circles) are based on the bits remaining after Alice and Bob’s 
computers carry out error correction over the LAN.  Starting with the raw key, they shuffle and 
block the key data 3 times, each time comparing row parities and bisectively searching out the 
errors in rows with parities that mismatch.  The block sizes are chosen to leave é10 errors after 
three stages. The sparse remaining errors are found by comparing parities of randomly selected 
matching subsets of one-half of the remaining bits.  If for a given draw the parities disagree (as 
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will occur with probability 12  if there are any remaining errors), a bisective search is used to find 
and eliminate the error.  Success is assumed after 20 consecutive parity matches occur.  In both 
the block and random subset operations, a bit is discarded for each parity bit revealed.   
As a by-product of the error correction procedure, an estimate of the initial BER is 
obtained.  This estimate is needed for privacy amplification.  The actual BER’s as a function of 
µ  are also plotted (diamonds) in figure 5.  Based on the estimated BER and the measured value 
of µ , Alice and Bob compute an estimated upper bound, E , for the number of bits of 
information Eve possesses about their ecN  error-corrected bits.  To generate privacy-amplified 
key bits, Alice and Bob’s computers continue to compute parities for matched subsets of one-
half of the error-corrected bits (selected using a publicly transmitted random matrix), but now,  
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Figure 5.  Key generation with the all-fiber system over (a) 10 and (b) 20 km 
links.  The raw- (squares), error corrected- (circles) and privacy-amplified 
(triangles) key rates and bit error rates (diamonds) are plotted against µ .  
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rather than publicly comparing them, Alice and Bob keep these parities as secret key bits.  
( )ecN E s− −  bits are generated in this way.  The privacy amplification theorem asserts that, for a 
chosen s , Eve’s information about the final key will be at most 2 ln 2s−∼  bits [1,2].   
 
4.2. Privacy amplification 
The maxima in the privacy amplified key rates versus µ  seen in figure 5 reflect the tradeoff 
between low photon arrival rate and high BER at low µ , and Eve’s increasing ability to gain 
information about the pulses at high µ .  The degree of vulnerability of weak laser pulses to 
eavesdropping is a central and interesting question.  The rates for privacy-amplified key 
generation in figure 5 were calculated using the simple BB84 estimate that Eve obtains fractions 
2 BER⋅  and µ  of the sifted bits using read-and-replace and beamsplitting attacks, respectively 
[1,2].  For a low BER this approximation gives a key rate that goes as ( )1µ µ−∼ , with a 
maximum near 0.5µ =  and falling to zero as 1µ → .  For the 10-km link, using the BB84 leak 
estimate gives a maximum key rate ~1.5 kbit/s for 0.3µ = , while for the 20-km link, the ~ 4 dB 
greater attenuation, higher backscattering, and consequently increased BER reduce the privacy-
amplified key rate at 0.3µ =  by about an order of magnitude, to 200 bit/s.    
Analyses that consider more sophisticated eavesdropping attacks have been recently made 
[25-33], in some cases granting Eve powers within the realm of known physics, but far beyond 
those provided by today’s technology.  Lütkenhaus [29-31], for example, considers a scenario 
where Eve can measure the photon number for each pulse, block the single photon pulses, 
enhance the transmission of multi-photon pulses, and learn the exact state for pulses containing 
two or more photons, allowing perfect re-sending.  Gilbert and Hamrick (G&H) [32] make a 
similar analysis, but allow Eve less information for 2-photon pulses, arguing that their state 
cannot be analyzed perfectly and that only those pulses where Eve and Bob each detect one 
photon contribute to Eve’s knowledge of the error-corrected key.  This is an important 
distinction, since double-photon pulses are relatively numerous.   
Figure 6 compares the key generation rates versus µ  calculated according to the 
prescriptions of these authors for various levels of system efficiency with those given by the 
simple BB84 estimate (shown in blue) [1,2].  The calculated curves assume dark count rates and 
backscattering levels typical of our system with the 10-km fiber link.  The predicted net key rates 
are similar for ideal channels (quantum efficiency η  and link transmission T  both equal to 1), 
but diverge for lower η  and T .  Using the prescription of G&H gives a bit rate of 200 bit/s for 
our 10-km system rather than the 1.5 kbit/s obtained with the simple BB84 prescription, and no 
net bits with for the 20-km link.  Our 20-km BER is increased significantly (by 2-3%) owing to 
the greater intensity of backscattered light at 1.3-µm arriving at the detectors.  One solution to 
this problem is to run Bob’s laser intermittently, storing a train of pulses behind Alice’s 
attenuator in a delay line [14], and detecting the returning photons during periods when no 
backscattered photons are present.  While the system duty-factor is somewhat reduced using this 
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approach, the very high cost of increased BER to key generation makes the trade-off highly 
worthwhile for longer distances.  
In considering what level of data sacrifice is required for adequate privacy amplification, it 
is helpful to consider the point of view of the Geneva group [3,33]:  whereas perfect security 
would be infinitely costly and impractical, practical security to a very high level is achievable 
with current level QKD systems if we accept quite reasonable limits on Eve’s abilities.  For 
example, large high-speed quantum memories with very long retention times are unavailable, 
and could be defeated simply by delaying sufficiently the exchange of basis information.  
Alternatively, Alice and Bob could generate all matching basis choices on the fly by using some 
initially shared secure key information, and never need to reveal the bases [34]!  In either of 
these cases Eve would be forced to analyze the photons split from 2-photon pulses without a 
priori knowledge of the bases, which halves the information she can obtain about them.  The 
optimum value of µ  and the net rate of key generation for our 10-km link approximately double 
if the G&H leak estimate is modified in this way, as shown by one example in figure 6.         
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Figure 6.  Secure key bits generated per pulse for several detector quantum 
efficiencies, η , and Alice-to-detector transmission values, T , according to the 
information leakage bounds given in [1,2], [30] and [32].  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Autocompensating quantum cryptography systems make it possible to generate shared, secret 
cryptographic key data at kilobit-per-second rates over distances up to a few tens of kilometers.  
The advantage of the autocompensating approach is that it allows accurate optical readout of the 
quantum information with no monitoring or active control of the optical properties of the system, 
despite the presence of random, time-varying disturbances of the fiber link.    This is 
accomplished by using a differential phase coding that is immune to these disturbances. 
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